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A widely accepted principle of lawmaking is there should be equivalence between online and offline
laws. The application of this principle requires the achievement of functional equivalence, irrespective
of whether there is also formal equivalence of wording. However, there are complex barriers, deriving
from the nature of the online technologies, to doing so successfully. In many instances the only way
to achieve equivalence is via a fundamental reform of offline law. Ultimately, this process will leave
little if any room for a separate law of cyberspace.
1 Introduction
When dealing with cyberspace, lawmakers often claim to be guided by the principle that there should
be equivalence of legal treatment between online and offline activities. The first public statement of
this kind was made in the Bonn Ministerial Conference Declaration of 6-8 July 1997, which declared
in its principle 22:
Ministers stress that the general legal frameworks should be applied online as they are off-line. In
view of the speed at which new technologies are developing, they will strive to frame regulations
which are technology-neutral, whilst bearing in mind the need to avoid unnecessary regulation.1
*I.J.L. & I.T. 249 The statement only applied to the general body of existing law, leaving the way
open to deal with cyberspace-specific issues in different ways on a case-by-case basis. However,
within a few years lawmakers began to view the principle as more widely mandating an approach in
which all laws and regulations should, so far as possible, be equivalent online and off-line. In other
words, the same legal principles should regulate an online technology activity as those which applied
to the equivalent off-line technology activity.2
This article sets out to explore the circumstances in which this principle can successfully be applied to
the regulation of cyberspace, and to identify situations where its application is problematic. It also
examines the reverse effect of the principle on offline law.
It is worth pointing out at this stage that there is real potential for confusion between the principles of
equivalence and technology neutrality. Indeed, the Bonn Ministerial Conference Declaration quoted
above links the two expressly. For the purposes of this article, equivalence guides the law maker as
to the principles of law which should apply to cyberspace activities and to some extent helps shape
the substantive rules. Technology neutrality addresses the choice between the available substantive
rules which could be used to implement those legal principles. In broad terms, technology neutrality
means that the implementing rules should not favour or discriminate against a particular technology3 ,
though the detailed usage of the concept is far more complex than this4 because the two principles
aim at achieving different but related ends. Sometimes the term technology neutrality is used to mean
what I have described elsewhere as ‘technology indifference’5 , which attempts to define a rule in
such a way that it applies equally well to the activity whatever technology is used to undertake it. This
is broadly similar to the concept of formal equivalence explained below. More commonly, though, the
term is used to describe a legislative aim that the rules should not discriminate between technologies
and should continue to apply effectively even if new technologies are developed. Such a rule might be
devised only for online activities, and is therefore not necessarily aiming at equivalence online and
offline.
*I.J.L. & I.T. 250 2 What does Equivalence Mean?
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The first problem with adopting a principle of equivalence is that the term does not have a clear
meaning in the context of lawmaking. Maurice Schellekens identifies two main ways in which it has
been used.6 The first is as an overarching policy statement that there should be broad equivalence of
treatment for offline and online activities while remaining agnostic as to how such equivalence should
be achieved. As Schellekens points out, this tells us nothing about the lawmaking techniques
involved:
The law is a black-box and its output must meet certain requirements. It is for lawyers to figure out
how the requirements can be met.7
The alternative usage is that the principle acts as a substantive guideline for the application of
existing law or the creation of new law. However, this too is ambiguous.
One way in which it might be applied is to say that the same rule has to apply to both online and
offline situations. In other words, the search is for a single rule or, where the rule is reiterated for
different situations in, for example, sectoral regulation, for the equivalent rules to be worded
identically. There are numerous examples of equivalence in this purely formal sense from the cases
which applied existing law, devised before cyberspace came into existence, to online activities. The
problem which these cases highlighted was that differences between online and offline technologies
and practices often resulted in the effect of the rule being very different as between them. As an
example, the established offline rule in defamation law was that a publisher is liable to the person
defamed, in addition to the author.8 Applying this rule without modification to online material will often
produce the result that the host of an internet resource such as a website or newsgroup is made liable
for defamatory content of which the host had no knowledge and could not discover without taking
unusual precautions.9 The effect of the rule is very different for an offline publisher, who rarely
publishes material which not first been reviewed by representatives of the publisher such as editors.
The alternative way of using the principle as a substantive guideline is to seek to achieve functionally
equivalent treatment irrespective of whether the activity takes place online or offline. In theory this
might be combined *I.J.L. & I.T. 251 with an attempt at formal equivalence, by seeking new wording
for the rule which seems equally applicable to both, but this creates a risk that the offline effects of the
rule might be altered unintentionally. It is therefore usually only appropriate if a full review of the law is
undertaken10 or a completely new rule is being formulated.11 In most recent legislation, even though
the lawmaker might reasonably be expected to have online activities in mind, there is little evidence of
attempts to achieve formal equivalence but numerous examples of rules written specifically to deal
with online behaviour.
The most common way of using the principle seems to be to lay down general principles of law, and
then to create specific rule-sets to deal with the particular difficulties which arise online in an attempt
to achieve functional equivalence. Specific adoption of this approach can be found, for example, in
the UK FSA's policy document ‘New Regulator for a New Millennium’12 , which explained how it
intended to apply the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Apostolos Gkoutzinis writes:
This policy means that the FSA will not discriminate in its approach on the basis of delivery channel
alone, unless the risks to the statutory objectives justify it. Nevertheless, non-discrimination does not
suggest the imposition of the same requirements on all delivery channels, since the risk may differ but
it does require the FSA to be able to justify any differences by reference to the features of the specific
medium.13
The Act itself made no specific provision for online activities, but has been amended numerous times
since its enactment to introduce detailed online rules.14
This approach seeks equivalence of application of the rules, in other words that the obligations
imposed on the subject of the rules should be broadly equivalent in burden once allowance has been
made for the differences between the online and offline versions of the activity. There is however a
second element of functional equivalence, equivalence of outcome , which also needs to be
considered.
Perhaps the clearest example of an attempt to achieve equivalence of outcome can be seen in the
case of electronic signatures. In the common law world, manuscript signatures simply perform
evidential functions, *I.J.L. & I.T. 252 and so the common law jurisdictions have experienced no
difficulty in translating the rules for online signatures in a way which achieves equivalent effect.15
However, in civil law jurisdictions signatures often have a formal significance which derives from the
physical action of writing one's name on paper. Because this physical action cannot be replicated
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online those jurisdictions have experienced substantial difficulty in modifying their laws.16
To solve this difficulty the EU e-Signatures Directive17 introduced the concept of an ‘advanced
electronic signature’ which, if supported by a qualifying identity certificate issued by an appropriate
person, would be legally equivalent to a hand-written signature.18 The intention of this measure was
clearly to establish equivalence of outcome between online and offline signatures, and there is no
doubt that it did so in purely legal terms. As a matter of law, throughout the EU such electronic
signatures are legally equivalent to manuscript signatures.
Where the Directive failed was that it ignored the question of the utility of this new kind of electronic
signature. Manuscript signatures require no technology more complex than a pen, and are easy and
cheap to apply to a document. By contrast advanced electronic signatures require expensive
technology, major changes to the ways that users interact with each other, and detailed legal and
technical advice before they can be adopted.19 The minimal adoption of advanced electronic
signatures by internet users demonstrates this failure very clearly.20 The lesson to be drawn here is
that an attempt to achieve functional equivalence must not consider just the purely legal effects of a
rule. It must also encompass the effects of the rule on the wider environment in which the activity is
undertaken.
The difficulty with the aim of achieving functional equivalence is often that online and offline activities
are so different that it may be almost impossible to assess the application and outcome of the rules
on a comparable basis. To return to defamation, in many jurisdictions the law has *I.J.L. & I.T. 253
been amended to introduce new rules which apply only online. These rules attempt to achieve
equivalence by conferring some degree of immunity on an online host of defamatory material21 or by
redefining the term publisher to exclude some categories of online actor.22 However, the result may
well have been to favour online publishing over offline in some circumstances.23 Given the substantial
operating differences between online hosting and offline publishing, it is far from clear what
equivalence of treatment between them might be.
3 Equivalence as a Policy Statement
Does a policy statement announcing an aim that there should be equivalence between online and
offline law serve any useful purpose? The answer must be yes, at the very least because the
statement makes a normative assertion about the ways in which online actors are expected to
behave. The standards to which such actors will be held are to be broadly the same as the standards
offline.
A normative statement of this kind goes some way towards countering the natural human tendency to
treat cyberspace as somewhere ‘other’ where different, and usually lower, standards of behaviour are
permissible. This tendency is well-documented, and we know that many users of online fora engage
in a degree of aggression and casual abuse which they would not show face-to-face24 , while those
who would never dream of making multiple physical copies of a music CD for friends are perfectly
happy to engage in file-sharing.25
If online and offline law were radically different, it would be necessary for users to make a complex
mental switch when going online. Human beings already have difficulty in complying with all the rules
which currently apply to their offline activities, and it is unrealistic to expect them to learn a separate
set of ground rules to govern their online lives.
It might be objected that the online world already has a number of established legal rules which do
not apply offline. One example is the *I.J.L. & I.T. 254 system for resolving disputes over domain
name registration, which deals with a problem which does not exist in the offline world. However, that
system is based on concepts of contract and trade marks which originated in the offline world, and is
clearly developing via the extension of offline law principles rather than creating a completely new set
of legal norms.26 A more apposite example might seem to be the requirement under the Electronic
Commerce Directive for businesses to identify themselves and give an offline address and contact
details.27 Even here, we can find a long-standing offline principle that traders should be identifiable in
the requirements for company registration and the UK Business Names Act 1985 s. 4(1), and at the
EU level the need for offline as well as online sellers to be identifiable is set out in the Distance
Selling Directive.28 The additional obligations imposed by the Electronic Commerce Directive simply
extend these offline principles to cope with the complete lack of physical contact in the offline world.
These connections between the rules online and offline are important. The policy statement would
lose its normative effect if the rules were so often different that it became apparent that there was no
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match between the policy and reality. This does not, of course, mean that there must never be a
difference between online and offline law. However, those differences need to be kept as few as
possible, and to be justified, if the policy is to have any meaning.
4 Equivalence as a Substantive Guideline
Although the policy statement can serve a useful purpose, its implementation into substantive law is
not easy. The greatest difficulty lies in defining or assessing whether a proposed implementation of
the policy does in fact produce equivalent treatment between online and offline activities. Schellekens
points out:
The law regulates relations between persons. Every person has his own position and interests,
worthy of legal protection. A rule is, in one way or another, the outcome of a balancing of the interests
involved. A rule has, for example, the rationale to protect one interest and in doing so, it takes
account of other, flanking interests. The relation between the *I.J.L. & I.T. 255 interests or the way in
which a balance can be found between conflicting interests on-line may be quite different off-line.29
He goes on to say that in some cases the appropriate solution may be a new rule for online activities,
applying the offline rationale in a different way to take account of online differences.30
Whether a different rule is required to achieve equivalence depends to a large extent on the primary
focus of the rule. If its most important element is the mental state of the subject, as is the case for
much of the criminal law, then it is usually easy to achieve online and offline equivalence through an
identical, or slightly modified, version of the offline rule. If, however, the rule focuses on the behaviour
of the actor rather than his or her mental state, there is likely to be a need for a different rule if the
nature of the behaviour online is radically different from the offline situation.
4.1 Rules Targeting Mental States
Many of the legal rules which are designed to regulate human activities in general are expressed in
terms of the mental state of the actor when engaged in the activity in question. The reason these
rules require little or no modification to be applied to online activities in an equivalent way is that a
user's mental state will generally be much the same whether acting online or offline.
Criminal law rules often define offences in terms of the intention of the defendant, and there has been
no real difficulty in applying general purpose rules, such as those against harassment, to online actors
who are simply using the internet as a new vehicle to engage in criminal conduct.31 Problems have
arisen, however, where an essential element of the offence involves the mental state of the victim as
opposed to the defendant. Because computer and communications technologies permit automated
decision-making, it may not be possible to identify a human victim who has the required mental state.
In the UK this issue arose in relation to the offence of fraud, which required a victim to have been
deceived. The initial approach to resolving this problem was via piecemeal amendment of specific
offences32 , but the Law Commission identified that this was not a satisfactory solution and
recommended complete reform of the law *I.J.L. & I.T. 256 of fraud.33 The Fraud Act 2006 deals with
the problem by redefining the offence in terms of the defendant's intention only, thereby producing a
rule which works in an equivalent way both online and offline.34
Mental states also play a role in non-criminal rules. Contract formation is an obvious example,
requiring the reaching of an agreement between the parties.35 The means of communication used to
form this agreement, whether online or offline, are irrelevant, and thus the only legal difficulties in this
area have arisen under legal systems which impose formal requirements for such agreements to be
legally valid contracts.36
4.2 Rules Targeting Behaviours
Where legal rules target the behaviour of actors, irrespective of their intentions, achieving functional
equivalence between their online and offline application can be more difficult. In the early days of
public use of the internet, when the courts had no choice but to apply the existing offline rules, many
examples of non-equivalent effects became apparent. When laws designed specifically for online
situations were enacted, it was also common to discover that the effects they produced were different
from what had been expected37 , and thus produced non-equivalent treatment of the online situation.
Part 4 of this article attempts to analyse the reasons which made the achievement of equivalence so
problematic.
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4.3 A Tentative Methodology
We have seen that if the rule in question is primarily concerned with the mental state of the person
subject to the rule, there should be little difficulty in achieving online/offline equivalence. However,
where the rule focuses on regulating behaviours we need a methodology to guide our implementation
of the offline principles into a new rule of substantive law.
The methodology proposed here has three stages:
• Identifying the various interests which the rule needs to take into account;
• Analysing the ways in which the new rule is likely to affect those interests; and
• Evaluating the resultant balance of interests to decide if it is equivalent to the offline situation.
*I.J.L. & I.T. 257 The first of these is not obviously difficult, though as we shall see later there are a
number of fields of law where it is far from clear which interests are intended to be affected by the
rules. The second requires the lawmaker to predict the ways in which online activities will develop,
and lawmakers have a track record of poor predictions in this area.38 The third is clearly problematic
because the balance of interests is unlikely to be identical under the new online rule, and it is not
obvious how a lawmaker should judge whether a diminution in one interest is adequately balanced by
an improvement in another.
It may be possible to derive some insight into these problems by examining known hard cases, where
difficulties have arisen when attempting to apply existing rules to new online activities or creating new
online rules which have equivalent effects to their offline counterparts.
5 Why is Equivalence Hard to Achieve?
This article suggests that there are four categories of online activity which differ from their offline
versions in ways which make it difficult to produce rules with equivalent effect for both. The first arises
from the technical characteristics of the internet technologies, which can encourage or even mandate
that the activity is carried out in different ways. The second category contains those activities whose
effects are qualitatively different when carried out online. The third encompasses activities which are
completely new, and thus have no offline equivalent. The final category consists of activities which fall
clearly into a single legal domain offline, but where the convergence of communications technologies
potentially subjects that activity to more than one legal domain when conducted online.
For the first and second of these categories, the differences in the nature or effects of the online
activity often highlight the fact that the pre-existing offline law did not clearly identify or define the
interests which the law was balancing. The third and fourth categories are prone to categorisation
difficulties, where the activity is erroneously diagnosed as falling within an existing legal
categorisation or where it clearly falls within more than one category and is thus subject to multiple
rule-sets.
5.1 Uncertain Interest Balancing
5.1.1 New ways of acting
It is obviously true that the technology used for online activities can result in those activities being
very different in nature from their offline counterparts. Although obvious, this is not particularly helpful.
If we wish to understand *I.J.L. & I.T. 258 the problem deeply enough to be able to assess why
equivalence is hard to achieve, we must analyse the reasons for these differences.
The internet technologies exhibit a number of features which are not present offline, and which are
relevant to the problem of equivalence. All of these are emergent properties of the way in which
communications are carried between the networks of computers which constitute cyberspace.
The fundamental difference from the offline world is that all online communications are transported in
digital form, and thus there is no movement of any physical property which acts as a carrier for the
information which constitutes the communication. This is very different from digital information
recorded on a physical carrier such as a CD. All the other features which differ from the offline world
derive from this digitisation and dematerialisation.
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The second feature is that the method of information transport is via copying the communication from
computer to computer39 , unlike sending a letter in which the physical package is moved from place to
place. The third, related to this, is that numerous intermediaries become involved in the
communication, all copying and transmitting the information.
Fourthly, digitisation allows automation of decisions, such as whether to send the communication in
the first place and what to do with it when it is received. As a consequence, a large element of human
oversight and decision-making disappears.
Fifth, the internet is borderless unless national barriers are introduced artificially.40 All addressees of
communications are equally close to the sender. Related to this, the sixth feature is that one-to-many
communication is vastly easier than in the offline world, where the infrastructure required for
one-to-many communications is rare and expensive.41
Seventh and finally, the marginal cost of each internet communication is very nearly zero. Almost all
the costs are in setting up the infrastructure (computers, servers, internet connection services), and
these are largely fixed costs irrespective of the amount of communication which takes place.
An important consequence of these features of cyberspace is that when an activity is moved online,
aiming to achieve the same purposes as offline, the technology both encourages the actor to do this
in new ways and constrains him from replicating all the features of the offline activity.
To illustrate this, let us take the example of Georgina who publishes a hard-copy specialist-interest
magazine. She does this as a labour of love, *I.J.L. & I.T. 259 not seeking to make a profit, and the
five hundred recipients of the magazine, all of whom are in the UK, pay an annual subscription which
covers the cost of production and mailing.
When she transforms the magazine into a website, the internet technologies encourage Georgina to
make a number of changes in the way she communicates with her readers:
• Her costs will plummet, because she no longer has to print and mail the physical copies. There will
be some small costs for web hosting, but these can probably be covered by incorporating advertising
links onto her web pages. Advertising was previously not possible because the magazine had too
small a circulation.
• If her readers find the advertisements attractive and click through from them to the advertisers' sites,
Georgina may find that she begins to make a profit, transforming her activity into a business.
• As Georgina is not charging, the website can be open to the whole world. It is therefore likely to be
viewed from many countries other than the UK by those sharing the special interest.
• In the offline magazine, Georgina could only include text and images of which she had copies. Now
she can link to all kinds of material hosted on other websites, incorporating them virtually as part of
her own offering.
• The website will allow her to host audio and video clips, something which was not possible in a hard
copy magazine.
• Website hosting services often provide tools for creating discussion fora, and if Georgina uses these
she will be hosting material provided by her users, probably unmoderated unless she is prepared to
devote substantially more time to the project.
The technology also constrains Georgina from, among other things, restricting website access to her
existing five hundred subscribers. There is no easy way of doing this42 , and in any event why should
she bother given the advantages of allowing free access? Similarly, she cannot easily limit access to
UK-based users, and as we have seen the technology encourages her to make the website
accessible world-wide.
If we attempt to apply the methodology proposed in part 3.3 above, the difficulties in achieving
equivalence of effect become immediately apparent. The field of copyright law is particularly relevant
to offline magazines and so we shall examine some rules from that field here.
In her offline magazine Georgina will generally43 infringe copyright in any materials she includes in it
unless she has permission from the *I.J.L. & I.T. 260 rightholder, for example the author of the text
and the owner of copyright in photographs. This is because making copies, distributing copies or
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making the work available to the public are all infringing acts.44 However, when Georgina starts her
website she can ‘include’ materials on other websites in her offering simply by linking to them, so that
she does not need to make copies or host them on her website.
Applying the offline rule produces real uncertainty as to whether the linking is an infringement of
copyright.45 All Georgina's website contains, even in the case of in-line links46 , are the addresses of
those materials via which the user's web browser can download them direct from the websites which
host them. The complaint in such cases is not really about unlicensed copying, but rather that
Georgina has made the materials accessible in a way which the rights owner did not intend47 , and
potentially also that she is taking unfair advantage of the rightholder's work for her own benefit without
making payment.48
Step one of our tentative methodology immediately identifies that it is unclear precisely what interests
of the rightholder are intended to be protected by the rules. If those interests are defined narrowly, in
terms solely of controlling the making and dissemination of copies of the work, then Georgina's
website does not really affect those interests at all because the rightholder still controls those
matters.49 This would mean that the application of the offline rules to the website produced equivalent
effects, and no modification of the rules is required. If, though, the interests of the rightholder include
control of all forms of dissemination of the work, it appears that Georgina's website does affect those
interests.
There is no consensus about which of these analyses of the rightholder's interests is the correct one.
It is impossible to continue with the methodology in an attempt to find a rule of equivalent effect until
the relevant interests have been defined.
This lack of clarity about the interests to be balanced is very common. Copyright, like many other of
our law-systems, developed incrementally *I.J.L. & I.T. 261 over a long period of time. New rights
were added on a piecemeal basis to deal with issues as they arose. The question whether the
rightholder's interests are limited to controlling the making of and dealing in copies, or whether they
extend to include wider control over dissemination of the work, never needed to be considered in the
offline world. This is because the only known methods of disseminating a work widely for reading and
viewing involved physical transfer of copies, so that control of those copies inevitably gave de facto
control of dissemination until the cyberspace technologies removed that control.
The reforms to copyright law as a result of the advent of cyberspace, and particularly the granting of
some immunities to intermediaries against infringement liability and other liabilities arising from the
carriage and hosting of digital information, made no attempt to achieve online and offline equivalence.
A new type of actor had emerged, and it was clear that the uncertain application of offline rules to the
activities of intermediaries might hamper the development of the internet.50 Granting blanket immunity
was a pragmatic measure to protect the nascent interests of these new actors, and of society
generally in the development of the internet, but took little account of the interests of those who had
rights in information or were affected by its communication. Judges are beginning to look for ways to
change this new balance of interests51 and proposals to modify the immunity are increasingly being
put forward.52
As an interim conclusion, therefore, we have identified that one of the reasons why the new features
of the internet technologies make it hard to produce rules with online and offline equivalence is that
the new behaviours which arise from those technologies highlight the fact that the existing rules do
not contain a clear understanding of the interests which the law has to balance. This is, however, not
the only reason for our difficulties.
5.1.2 Qualitatively Different Consequences of the Activity
In some cases the consequences of moving an activity online appear at first sight to be very much the
same as when the activity is conducted offline. Further thought often reveals, however, that their
scope has increased so *I.J.L. & I.T. 262 widely that they are in fact qualitatively different from the
same activity conducted offline.53
A good example of such an activity is private copying of a copyright work. In most of the Civil Law
jurisdictions private copying is a permitted exception to the rightholder's exclusive rights.54 Offline
copying of a book or a CD requires physical contact between the copier and the work to be copied,
and this therefore limits the extent of private copying. Once the work is accessible in digital form
online, however, anyone with an internet connection can copy it without needing to move from their
desktop. This produces a dramatic increase in the quantity of private copies made, an increase which
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is so large that it seems likely to destroy the current music industry business model.55
The qualitative change in the consequences of private copying inevitably led to a debate about
whether the rule should be changed online. Schellekens points out56 that the two sides of the debate
focused on different interests; proponents of change argued that the interests of rightholders were
being damaged, and that the private copier had no interests to protect, whereas opponents identified
interests in protecting the private life of the users of works and in freedom to communicate information
as paramount. This debate had not been necessary offline because private copying was seen as de
minimis and, in practice, not something which could be controlled effectively. In other words, the
interests which the offline rule balanced had not previously been defined.
The private copying exception is an example where, in the EU at least, the methodology proposed in
part 3.3 was followed in an attempt to achieve online and offline equivalence of effect. Art. 5(2)(b) of
the EU Copyright Directive57 permitted Member States to maintain their private copying exceptions
under more restrictive conditions than previously, and the Explanatory Memorandum to the proposal
for the Directive58 explains the factors to be taken into account in determining the appropriate
balance, which include compensation for rightholders and respect for the three step test set out in art.
9(2) of the Berne Convention. A consultation by the European Commission on the exception has
been in progress *I.J.L. & I.T. 263 since 200459 and the Belgian and French courts have
reconsidered the appropriateness of the balance, deciding that the three step test is the paramount
statement of the balance and that national law needs to be interpreted in that light.60
It seems reasonable to conclude that the appropriate balance between the interests of private copiers
and rightholders has still to be established. For that reason, we can also conclude that there is not yet
equivalence of effect between the online and offline rules relating to private copying.
To take a second example, the qualitatively different consequences of publishing defamatory material
online, compared to offline, have shown that English defamation law embodies a balance of interests
which is almost certainly inappropriate for cyberspace. English law has traditionally concentrated on
protecting the interests of the defamed person only and this, coupled with placing the burden of
proving truth on the defendant, has led to it being recognised as the world's most claimant-friendly
jurisdiction. The English courts adopt the principle set out in Australia in Gutnick v Dow Jones 61 that
publication of an online defamatory statement occurs where it is read, and that each reading is a fresh
publication with its own limitation period.62 In consequence, a claimant who has any kind of reputation
in England63 is able to bring an English defamation action by proving no more than that the website
containing the defamatory statement was accessible in England.64
This tilting of the balance in favour of the interests of the defamed person did not seem to present
insuperable problems in the offline world. UK authors and publishers learnt to work within its
constraints, and the UK press was not thought to be notably less free than in other countries.
However, it is generally recognised that the minimal weight given by English defamation law to the
interests in free speech and press freedom poses particular problems for online publishers. It has
even been reported that some US publishers are blocking online access from UK IP addresses.65 As
a consequence, the UK government is reconsidering the balance of interests. The Ministry of Justice
is consulting on reforming the multiple publication rule66 , and since the publication of that consultation
the Minister of *I.J.L. & I.T. 264 Justice has announced plans for major law reform to end ‘libel
tourism’, particularly in relation to online publication.67
Where the consequences of taking an activity online are qualitatively different from its offline
equivalent it seems likely that an attempt to achieve equivalence by applying the existing offline
principles is doomed to failure. Equivalence is likely to be achievable only by conducting a review of
the interests involved, both on- and offline, with the aim of developing new rules which can be applied
in both situations.
5.2 Categorisation Problems
The second reason why equivalence of effect is hard to achieve can be that an online activity has
been wrongly categorised. Categorisation is a fundamental part of legal analysis. Lawyers are trained
to review an activity, identify potentially applicable categories under the existing law, and then assign
the activity to its most appropriate category. This analytical method enables to the lawyer to advise
which rule-set from the existing law applies to the activity.
Where the most similar existing category is not a good fit for a completely new activity, in spite of the
apparent similarities, this is a defective method for determining the appropriate legal solution. In the
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first instance an inappropriate offline rule will be applied, even though it is not properly adapted for the
new activity. Following this, the error will be compounded when it becomes clear that a new rule is
necessary because the search for a new rule will inevitably start from the existing categorisation,
which was wrong in the first place. The tendency is always to regulate the new activity by modifying
an existing legal regime, rather than subjecting it to a de novo analysis with a view to developing a
new and appropriately fitting rule-set.
Categorisation problems also arise when there are two distinct offline categories, each with its own
rule-set, but conducting the activity online converges the categories so that it is no longer obvious
which the online activity fits into. The potential to apply both rule-sets can produce contradictory rules,
and inevitably makes the starting point for achieving equivalence entirely opaque.
5.2.1 No Offline Equivalent
In some cases an online activity is so completely new that it has no offline equivalent. Where this
happens, it might be thought that there would no question of attempting to achieve functional
equivalence to offline rules in its regulation, because there are no offline rules which are clearly
applicable to the new activity.
*I.J.L. & I.T. 265 However, this is too simplistic an approach. Even where an online activity is novel,
some aspects of that activity will necessarily appear similar to existing offline activities. There is thus a
temptation to seize on the similarities while ignoring the differences, and attempt to assimilate the
regulation of the new activity to the most closely matching offline activity.
This is precisely what occurred with the regulation of e-money. When the concept was first mooted in
the early 1990s it was clear that it did not exhibit any of the characteristics which would subject it to
existing financial services regulation, and was thus an almost completely unregulated activity in most
jurisdictions.68 In Europe there was strong pressure to regulate this new phenomenon69 , resulting in
the e-Money Directive 2000.70
The drafters of this Directive perceived the closest existing model to be that of payment systems
operated by deposit-taking banks, and therefore imported many characteristics from the regulation of
those institutions into the new law on e-money. Their aim was expressly to achieve some degree of
regulatory equivalence, described in the recitals to the Directive as being to ‘preserve a level playing
field between electronic money institutions and other credit institutions issuing electronic money’.71
However, the effect was in fact to impose a business model on e-money issuers which was entirely
inappropriate72 and may well have prevented the further development of e-payment services.73 A new
Directive was enacted in 2009 and will come into force in 201174 , and this new legislation abandons
the deposit-taking bank analogy in favour of a more generic model of payment service regulation
which was developed in the light of modern, on-line payment services.
The tendency to focus on categorisation can be seen particularly clearly in respect of the legal
regulation of search engines. Gasser identifies75 a *I.J.L. & I.T. 266 large number of strands which
make up the regulatory debate about search engines. All these strands derive from the categorisation
of search engine activities in terms of known offline activities. To take just a few as examples:
• The debate on infrastructure regulation places search engines in the category of utilities and argues
for or against their regulation along the same lines as telecoms and water companies.76
• The ownership debate divides quite clearly between those who place search engines in the same
category as ISPs and online communication network operators77 , and those who see them as
intentional copiers and republishers of others' material.78
• The content debate contains a wide variety of categories for its participants to use. A common divide
is between those who categorise search engines with newspapers, broadcasters and other free
speech facilitators79 and those who view them as executive arms of the pornography industry.80
To add a further example not listed by Gasser, the web crawling and deep linking activities of search
engines have been categorised by some courts and some commentators as trespasses to physical
property.81
The fact that search engines can, with little effort, be fitted into all these categories is surely a clear
indication that none of them provides an appropriate rule-set. One possible approach to the problem
would be to apply whichever rule-set. seems most apt, based on identifying the categorisation which
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most closely fits the facts of the actual case. This would produce a level of uncertainty in the law
which must be unacceptable. It seems clear that search engines are sui generis, and require a
rule-set which is crafted specifically for that purpose. Whether the concept of equivalence has any
part to play in that crafting is examined in part 6 below.
5.2.2 Convergence
The phenomenon of convergence has troubled lawmakers ever since the internet became a
pervasive means of communication. Courts were soon *I.J.L. & I.T. 267 asked to choose between
categorisation of ISPs as mere telecommunications carriers or as publishers82 , and websites as news
sources or cable programming services.83 Telecommunications regulation had for many years
established separate regulatory regimes for data carriage and voice telephony, but as soon as the
bandwidth became available to allow realtime audio carriage it became clear that these categories
had converged online so that it was impossible to define which regime applied.84
The internet communications technologies are completely indifferent to the content of the information
which passes across the internet. From the technological perspective, text, numbers, audio and video
are all the same thing. Regulatory distinctions based on the technologies used to communicate
(paper for text, electro-magnetic radiation for audio and video) become very difficult to maintain.
The problems facing lawmakers are illustrated particularly clearly in the EU's recent attempt to clarify
the application of television regulation to online audiovisual content. Most countries place constraints
on the types of content which can be included in television programmes, but do not apply those
constraints to audiovisual material made available via a website.85 The Audiovisual Media Services
Directive of 200786 aimed to maintain the regulatory control for television programming, whether
delivered by traditional broadcasting or online, and also to ensure that a less onerous regulatory
regime applied to ‘television-like’ on-demand online content whose provision ‘would lead the user
reasonably to expect regulatory protection’.87 This is a clear policy that there should be equivalence
between the regulation which applies to offline television and that which applies to similar content
services provided online.
However, the difficulties in achieving equivalence are substantial and have produced an unusual
drafting style. The recitals to the Directive, *I.J.L. & I.T. 268 which would normally state the reasons
why particular provisions are included, instead make lengthy statements about what its provisions
should achieve. This is perhaps in recognition that the nature of the technology makes it unlikely that
they will in fact achieve those aims.
As examples, recital 16 states:
… the definition of an audiovisual media service should cover only audiovisual media services,
whether television broadcasting or ondemand, which are mass media, that is, which are intended for
reception by, and which could have a clear impact on, a significant proportion of the general public …
but should not cover activities which are primarily non-economic and which are not in competition with
television broadcasting, such as private websites and services consisting of the provision or
distribution of audiovisual content generated by private users for the purposes of sharing and
exchange within communities of interest.
There was clearly no way to translate this optimistic statement into law, and so the definition which
decides whether or not an online activity is subjected to the regulatory regime is in fact that its
operator ‘has editorial responsibility for the choice of the audiovisual content of the audiovisual media
service and determines the manner in which it is organised.’88
Similarly hopeful statements are that the regulation should not apply to emails or to ‘websites that
contain audiovisual elements only in an ancillary manner, such as animated graphical elements, short
advertising spots or information related to a product or non-audiovisual service’89 , nor to online
versions of newspapers and magazines.90 The concept of ‘television’ is to include ‘near
video-on-demand’ online services, but not actual video-on-demand.91 Finally, ‘In the context of
television broadcasting, the notion of simultaneous viewing should also cover quasi-simultaneous
viewing because of the variations in the short time lag which occurs between the transmission and the
reception of the broadcast due to technical reasons inherent in the transmission process’, although
the actual definition refers only to simultaneous viewing.92
This article is not the place to discuss the merits and defects of the Directive93 , and only time will tell
whether the hopes expressed in its *I.J.L. & I.T. 269 recitals are matched by the decisions of the
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courts and the ways in which the online audiovisual content sector develops. My aim was rather to
illustrate the point that the regulation is firmly grounded in a categorisation labelled ‘television
broadcasting’, but that convergence resulting from the nature of the internet technologies has made
that categorisation, at best, problematic.
The term ‘convergence’ has been adopted to describe the situation where an online activity brings
two previously separate categories of regulation so close to each other that the boundary between
them becomes difficult to determine. What it can also indicate is that, as is the case for audiovisual
content, the online version of the activity has not merely converged the categories but has actually
merged them. In effect they have ceased to exist as separate categories so far as the online world is
concerned.
As a consequence, any attempt to categorise the online activity as a step towards achieving
equivalence of effect with the offline world is a pointless exercise. If equivalence is sought, it can only
be achieved by reforming the offline law to abolish or modify its categories in a way which is
compatible with the online world. This is the route taken in the most recent revision of the EU
communications regulation regime, which has abandoned the distinction between voice and data
carriage, in large part in an attempt to achieve online and offline equivalence.94
6 When can Equivalence be Achieved?
We have seen that making a policy statement that the law should be broadly equivalent online and
offline serves a useful purpose, but that using the concept of equivalence as a guideline for making
substantive law is more problematic. Part of the difficulty arises from the fact that ‘equivalence’ is hard
to define. Formal equivalence, where the wording of the rule is the same for cyberspace as for the
physical world, does not implement the policy unless it also achieves functional equivalence.
Functional equivalence is in part the achievement of congruence between the obligations imposed on
actors, but also requires the rule to produce similar economic and social outcomes in both online and
offline situations.
However, we have also seen that there are circumstances in which achieving equivalence is difficult,
perhaps impossible. How can we identify those cases where it is worth attempting to produce
equivalence?
The easiest situation is where the offline rule's fundamental obligations are based on the intentions or
beliefs of the subject, in other words on mental states. Rules of this type are common, and I have
argued in part 3.1 above that they can be applied to online activities with little or no *I.J.L. & I.T. 270
modification because the mental states of actors do not normally alter merely because they are acting
online. Here, formal equivalence of wording is also likely to achieve functional equivalence.
Offline rules which target behaviour, by imposing requirements on how an activity is conducted, are
less likely to be easily applicable to online actors without revision. This is because the internet
technologies make it possible, and often highly desirable, to carry out the activity in a different manner
from offline. Here, functional equivalence can be achieved by recasting the offline rule provided that
use of internet technologies does not make the activity so different from its offline analogue that
equivalence cannot be achieved. To decide whether the differences are too great, the lawmaker must
undertake two elements of analysis:
• First, the interests which are balanced by the offline rule must be identified, and then the online
activity must be analysed to discover whether the same interests are engaged. If this is the case, the
rule should be revised to achieve the same, or at least a broadly similar, balance online. The
lawmaker also needs to consider the utility of the online solution, as if the revised rule makes the
online activity more onerous or less effective than its offline counterpart the new rule will not achieve
full functional equivalence.95
• Second, the lawmaker needs to consider the categorisation of the online activity, because regulating
it by revising an offline rule clearly places that activity in the same category as the offline behaviour.
The dangers of false categorisation, and in particular the phenomenon of convergence through which
the technologies of cyberspace collapse and merge offline categories, have been explained at part
4.2 above.
If there is an identifiable set of interests which are engaged both online and off, and additionally the
online activity can accurately be categorised with its offline analogue, it is likely that functional
equivalence can be achieved by producing a revised version of the offline rules to apply online.
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Where the existing offline rule neither applies in an equivalent way to the offline situation, nor can be
modified to produce equivalence, the only remaining option is to undertake reform of the law to
produce a new ruleset which is capable of applying both online and offline. This approach is likely to
be workable if an appropriate set of interests can be identified for balancing, and if in addition a new
legal category can be devised which is capable of capturing both the online and offline activities.96
Where fresh categorisation is not possible, as seems likely for online ‘television-like’ activities97 , the
search for equivalence will probably fail.
*I.J.L. & I.T. 271 Ab initio law reform will also need to re-examine the fundamental basis of the
existing offline law. It is increasingly common to find, when a new activity goes online, that the legal
regulation of that activity offline depended on unarticulated assumptions which no longer hold true.
These tend to be assumptions about physical property, ownership or control which, once the activity
has been reduced to no more than dematerialised transactions in electronic information, cease to
hold true. We have seen examples of this from the laws relating to fraud, defamation, payment
services and telecommunications regulation, all of which identified that the offline law needed to be
changed if equivalence were to be achievable.
Such an overturning of assumptions can also occur because of policy decisions made to encourage
the development of cyberspace, such as the scheme of country of origin regulation established by
arts 3 and 4 of the Electronic Commerce Directive. As a consequence German unfair competition law,
which placed severe controls on advertising and other competitive activity by foreign traders, ceased
to apply to online sellers based in other EU Member States but remained in force for German sellers.
It was therefore swiftly reformed to achieve functional equivalence.98
As cyberspace permeates more and more activities, ab initio law reform is likely to increase. Because
such reform tends to produce laws which are both functionally and formally equivalent, we may
eventually see a decline in the approach of using heavily modified offline rules to govern cyberspace.
The principle of equivalence seems after all to be of more than symbolic value, and a rule which
applies equally well both online and offline is likely to achieve a higher degree of equivalence than
two different rule-sets whose combination of application and outcome merely aspire to be equivalent.
7 Intractable Cases
Where none of the approaches discussed in part 5 above can be used, the lawmaker will be forced to
acknowledge that this is a case where cyberspace mandates a non-equivalent regulatory regime.
However, we have seen that the number of such cases is very few.
Copyright law presents no major theoretical obstacles to achieving equivalence99 , but is nonetheless
an intractable case. This is because of the international copyright treaties, which constrain lawmakers
from undertaking unilateral law reform. International consensus on the interests at *I.J.L. & I.T. 272
stake, and the appropriate balance to be struck between them, is unlikely to be achieved in the near
future. Until there is consensus that fundamental reform is necessary we are unlikely to see any more
than failed attempts to achieve equivalence through the introduction of new rules for cyberspace
activities.
Broadcast content control is a second intractable case. We saw in part 4.2.2 above that online video
and audio content presents a major categorisation challenge, and that the EU's attempts to assimilate
parts of that content within broadcasting regulation are unlikely to be wholly successful. This seems to
be a case where a special regulatory regime for cyberspace alone is the only workable option.
However, the technological convergence which has created the categorisation problem may also
solve it in the longer term. The numbers watching television at the time it is broadcast seem to be
falling year on year100 and the trend among younger elements of the population is to decrease
television watching and increase access to content via cyberspace.101 If asynchronous access to
content via cyberspace becomes the norm, the political imperative to retain control of broadcast
content will diminish. As a consequence, ab initio law reform may become possible. If this happens, a
new regime which achieves both functional and formal equivalence is likely to result.
Search engines, as we saw in part 4.2.1, are an intractable case because there are so many offline
categories into which they can partially be placed that it is clear they amount to an entirely new
category of activity. Numerous court decisions held that their activities were not subject to legal
control102 , and there is little regulation designed specifically for that purpose.103 However, the
business model for search engines has evolved some distance from that of merely locating online
resources, and recent court decisions have begun to apply laws originally crafted for the offline
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104 There is likely very soon to be a need to develop a regulatory regime for search engines, which
balances the benefits they bring against the potential damage to the interest of content owners and
others. Such a regime would necessarily apply only to cyberspace.
The most interesting intractable case is that of online intermediary liability. At present there is no
offline equivalent to these intermediaries, and if they are to be regulated at all the regime must apply
to cyberspace alone. However, the granting of blanket immunities to internet intermediaries may in
the long term be seen to be a temporary expedient, designed *I.J.L. & I.T. 273 to prevent the
application of inappropriate offline rules in the period before reform was achievable. If the offline rules
are reformed to produce a regime which applies equally well online, as is currently proposed for UK
defamation law, the rationale for maintaining these immunities disappears.
During the course of researching this article I have become increasingly convinced that the principle
of equivalence is important, and that the long-term trend will be to achieve that equivalence through
ab initio reform of offline law. If I am correct, this will leave little space for special online rules. The
early dreams of a separate law of cyberspace105 are thus likely to remain unrealised.
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